New industries emerge thanks to the joint entrepreneurial actions of social actors in developing both a new knowledge base and institutional legitimacy. Creative industries have to deal with the supplementary tension between the domains of art and business, which carry different expectations, identities, constraints and opportunities. Industries trapped in a failure path face additional problems: not only a new knowledge base has to be developed but it has also to be recombined with the old one, not only legitimacy has to be obtained in an institutional void but hindering traces of past institutionalisation have to be dismantled. The Italian animated cartoon industry did find itself in the middle of such divergent institutional requirements. Fifteen years of steep decline followed the golden seventies and only recently the knowledge base, the governance structure and the basis of legitimacy are in the process of being redefined. The analysis of this re-founding process is presented here. Different kinds of trust relationships developed in the industry based on artistic and technical competence: networks of reciprocal artistic respect coexist with networks based on complementarity. Network centrality reduced the need for capital and increased profitability but joint projects were developed mainly by technologically complementary firms and did not involve artistic cooperation. I state here the importance of considering conflicting institutional demands deriving from different domains like art and business or from the persistence of past legitimisation in explaining the re-foundation of an industry.
Introduction
An industry is an emerging social system (Van de Ven/Garud, 1989) . New industries do not emerge ex novo, because they are shaped by existing social institutions and social trends creating new opportunities, which entrepreneurs take advantage of (Jones, 2001 ).
Therefore new industries emerge thanks to the joint entrepreneurial actions of social actors in developing both a new knowledge base and institutional legitimacy (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994) . Entrepreneurs are embedded in a social context without which they would not succeed: "entrepreneurs do not exist independent of organizational and societal contexts" (Mezias/Kuperman, 2000: 211) . Network entrepreneurship is the function that in an emerging industry actors have collectively to perform in order to organise joint action for getting institutional legitimacy, because new organisations "must establish ties with an environment that does not understand or acknowledge their existence" (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994: 648) . Mezias and Kuperman (2000: 211) add that "the study of entrepreneurship is incomplete if it ignores the collective process of entrepreneurship in the context of the organizational community". New organisations are vulnerable to the liability of newness, and "never more so than when entrepreneurs have few precedents for their actions" (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994: 663) .
But what if some precedents exist, but are hindering, like in the case of industries which faced a stage of decline? And what if some precedents exist, but are conflicting with each other, like in the case of creative industries with regard of the art and business duality? Industries trapped in a failure path face additional problems to newly emerging industries: not only a new knowledge base has to be developed but it has also to be recombined with the old one, not only legitimacy has to be obtained in an institutional void but hindering traces of past institutionalisation have to be dismantled. Therefore, similar to Aldrich and Fiol (1994) , which concentrated on the founding of completely new activities, in an institutional void, my aim is to identify factors hindering and supporting the re-foundation of an old activity as newly legitimate and effective, in an arena characterised by institutional traces of past adaptations and where the right balance between art and business has to be found.
The Italian animated cartoon industry is such an industry. Fifteen years of steep decline followed the golden seventies and only recently a new constellation of entrepreneurs redefined both the knowledge base, the governance structure and the basis of legitimacy. I apply here the concept of network entrepreneurship in order to explain the rebirth of the Italian animated cartoon industry. Indeed this industry has something in common with the mythical phoenix. Sales collapsed in the second half of the 1970s after the end of Carosello in 1977: the best Italian cartoonists left the country to seek work abroad (in France, Belgium and the United States) or switched to other sectors (advertising, comics) , and it seemed that the remaining small companies were destined to a precarious existence in niche markets (IslCult, 1998) . Given their still artisan-like production structure and their uncertainties as to whether they could cover their costs, these companies concentrated more on author-based than industrial production and their turnover amounted to no more than a few thousands Euro. Some of them, with a more business oriented identity, managed to adapt to the production of TV advertisements; others, with a more artistic identity, led the economically risky life of producing films as individual artists.
However, this apparently inevitable decline was arrested in the mid-1990s because a new constellation of entrepreneurs managed to change the fate of the industry to the extent that, after little more than five years, it is now internationally recognised as a consolidated reality. The 16 companies belonging to the association (which account for about 85% of all of the turnover of the sector in Italy) now find themselves managing jointly international projects (TV series consisting of 26 episodes lasting 26 minutes each, and full-length cinema films) each one of which is worth three, seven or ten million Euro.
The general objectives of the study were not only to identify what drove the various actors to revitalise the Italian animated cartoon industry and the reasons that prompted them to cooperate with each other, but also to try to understand how much the existence of their heritage of ideas, identities, skills and content facilitated or hindered the successful renaissance of the industry in a market context characterised by high production costs and extremely tough international competition. What was it that catalysed the activities of entrepreneurs? Is it possible to speak of the existence of a network, and what led to its creation? Was it the complementary nature of the different technologies? What was the weight of the sharing of the previous experiences of major operators?
More precisely, the research I carried out with the help of three colleagues in the Italian animated cartoon industry was aimed at understanding:
1. which new form of governance was discovered and applied, 2. how was the function of network entrepreneurship activated in mobilising joint action for gaining cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy, 3. whether the new governance allowed for a better coupling of the artistic and the business part, supporting the increase of the total turnover of the industry.
Section 2 describes the theory underlying the research and its working hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the methods used, and section 4 and 5 describes and discuss the results obtained. It will be shown that trust is highly dependent on both a calculating component and an experiential one. The calculating component, based on the attribution of innovation potential, will be shown as being particularly relevant in that it allows for higher firm growth in terms of turn over. Cooperation occurs in a industry characterised by the presence of a relatively dense social network among the majority of its members, which constituted the association Cartoon Italia as a formal mechanism for sustaining their pre-existing trust relations. Centrality in the network reduces the need for investment capital and increases profitability. But trust helps only to start cooperation when economic complementarity is present, while joint project development at an artistic level is hindered by the identities of social actors as indipendent creative artisans.
Theory
According to Aldrich and Fiol (1994: 647) "new industries emerge when entrepreneurs succeed in mobilising resources in response to perceived opportunities". In all new industries opportunities have to be identified, resources assembled, and employees recruited and trained, and all of these activities require that entrepreneurs cooperate to find ways of common action. Resources are of two kinds: 1. instrumental, and 2.
institutional (Powell/DiMaggio, 1991) .
Instrumental resources which are critical to the emergence of an industry are: "(a) basic scientific or technological knowledge, (b) financing, and (c) a pool of competent human resources" (Van de Ven/Garud, 1989: 207) . Joint actions regarding instrumental resources could be agreements on a dominant design, the definition of common standards, and the interfirm movement of personnel (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994: 654) . Through interactions entrepreneurs recognise areas of interdependence. Complementarity in front of supplies to customers, the necessity to combine resource for delivering a particular product or service, is one of the most important drivers of cooperation (Van de Ven/Garud, 1989) . But common action may also be based on communications between multiple firms representatives on industry and trade committees, friendship and kinship ties, and overlapping board membership: "Prior relationships and transactions among firms in the pursuit of an industry subsystem activity are remembered, and thereby become the infrastructure upon which subsequent relations are based" (Van de Ven/Garud, 1989: 217) . Key 'linking-pin' organisations play the key role of integrating the emerging industry, "serve as communication channels between industry participants, and link third parties by transferring resources, information, or specialties within and outside of the industry" ( Van de Ven/Garud, 1989: 218) . Moreover industry champions, usually "well represented on the association's board of directors" (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994: 658) , are of great importance in creating new associations, which help in the process of taking common action.
Acquiring institutional resources such as legitimacy is of equal importance for an industry to continue growing (Jones, 2001) . Legitimacy has to be obtained both internally and externally. Internally the establishment of industry-wide governance structures and procedures is required; externally the legitimacy takes the form of the industry being accepted in cognitive, normative and regulative terms (Scott, 1995) by other industrial, social, and political systems: "Access to capital, markets and governmental protection are all partially dependent on the level of legitimacy achieved by an emerging industry. (…) One can measure sociopolitical legitimation by assessing public acceptance of an industry, government subsidies to the industry, or the public prestige of its leaders" (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994: 647-8) .
According to the same authors entrepreneurial strategies aimed to promote new industry development try to gain both cognitive and normative-regulative ( sociopolitical) legitimation at different levels of analysis: organisational (using symbolic language and behaviours vs. developing trust by maintaining internally consistent stories), intraindustry (encouraging a dominant design vs. developing perceptions of reliabilities by taking collective actions), interindustry (developing knowledge base by promoting activity through associations vs. developing reputation by negotiating and compromising with other industries) and institutional (influencing the establishment of educational curricula vs. developing legitimacy by collective marketing and lobbying).
Particularly important is to consider that network entrepreneurs' careers shape the trajectory of institutional evolution, providing institutional resources, such as cultural models, rules of thumb, socio-political legitimacy, networks of relationships and structural positions (Jones 2001) . I hold that the identity of the involved entrepreneurs, which is shaped by their career, influences which legitimacy strategy they will pursue and how they will interact with the social context, which does "not only represent patterns of established meaning, but also sites within which renegotiations of meaning take place" (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994: 649 Aldrich and Fiol (1994) stress the importance of generating and sustaining trusting relationships in order to overcome low legitimacy in emerging industries:
"Trust, reliability, and reputation are methods of attaining cooperation based on increasing familiarity and evidence (Bateson, 1988) . Thus, the less information or evidence we have, the more we need to trust. (…) Trust is a critical first-level determinant of the success of founding entrepreneurs because, by definition, there is an absence of information and evidence regarding their new activity" (p. 650).
According to Gambetta (1988) , trusting means putting oneself in a situation of risk in relation to the trusted person insofar as he or she may actually behave in an opportunist manner. Once again according to Gambetta (1988) , the decision to run such a risk may be:
1 Weber considers as a normal situation in modern societies that even contradictory determinants of human agency coexist among the same group of people: "The fact that, in the same social group, a plurality of contradictory systems of order may all be recognized as valid, is not a source of difficulty for the sociological approach. Indeed, it is even possible for the same individual to orient his action to contradictory systems of order. […] In that case each is 'valid' precisely to the extent that there is a probability that action will in fact be oriented to it" (Weber, 1978 (Weber, /1921 ).
1. due to a calculation that sets off the expected advantages of a relationship against the uncertainty concerning the opportunism of the counterpart: i.e. trust based on an expectation of competence that outweighs the expectation of opportunism 2 ;
2. the result of a process in which the trust is based on past experience of the absence of opportunism.
I therefore expect that the degree of trust between two players depends on a convenience calculation of the utility of the relationship as well as on the history
of the relational experience with the counterpart (proposition 1).
In this second case, the trust can also take the form of institutionalised relations that are taken for granted ( Zucker, 1986; Lane/Bachmann, 1996) and be independent of the specific people involved -that's why Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998) can speak of an inter-organisational trust. According to Lane and Bachmann (1996) , the institutional component is even a necessary precondition for the emergence of interpersonal trust insofar as institutionalised mechanisms provide a "safety net" supporting interpersonal relations: "Partnership-based relationships are unlikely to arise spontaneously. Instead, they tend to be built on common expectations which are constituted by the institutional environment in which social actors are embedded" (p. 391). Such common expectations may find their expression in formalised institutions (regulations, associations, chambers of commerce, laws, intermediary institutions) or remain an implicit part of uncodified cultural norms and rules (Zucker, 1986) . However, regardless of whether they are formalised or remain culturally implicit, the institutionalisation of relationships of trust and social exchange should make it easier to identify cooperative frameworks, a standpoint also shared by Aldrich and Fiol (1994: 659) : "Government agencies can play a role in structuring the interorganizational environment of new industries in ways that encourage trusting relations between firms".
I therefore expect that the existence of a sufficiently dense structure of social relations and relationships of trust favours cooperation within the industry
(proposition 2).
As stated above, cooperation is not exclusively due to the intensity of social relations but it can be the result of the existence of complementarity between the resources of two partners. Grandori (2001: 420) define complementarity as follows: "Resources can be said to be complementary if they can be employed in combination for producing valuable outputs; or if an expansion of activity based on one resource raises the value of activities based on the other". For this study, I tried to integrate the perspective of complementarity with that of relational intensity by broadening the idea of Lane and Bachmann (1996) described above. I hold that relational structures can constitute a "safety net" supporting the relational potential offered by complementarity.
I therefore expect that the presence of a sufficiently dense structure of social and fiduciary relations particularly favours cooperation among the social actors possessing complementary resources (proposition 3).
In order to better specify the above stated importance of developing social ties for reaching instrumental and institutional objectives, I finally referred to the literature concerning organisational networks in order to verify the advantage that a group of small enterprises can obtain from structuring themselves in a network in order to pursue objectives of growth and innovative development. According to Perrow (1992) , the main advantage of a network of small companies is efficiency because, by specialising in one activity and asking their network partners to provide others, each company can obtain cost advantages due to economies of specialisation. On the other hand, in the case of small companies operating in creative industries, Salvemini and Delmestri (2000) sustain the thesis that the advantages of a relational network should be sought not only in the saving of economic resources, but also in the increased potential offered by the creative combination of resources, and therefore in the greater probability of finding innovative solutions that comes from the encounter of cognitively "specialised" firms that have different approaches to the economic and cultural challenges of the industry to which they belong.
Those firms that have a more central position in the internal relationships of the industry, and which make greater use of "network" resources, should therefore profit most from these supposed advantages. In the project-structured animated cartoon industry, the effect of the increase in production potential can be assessed on the basis of the number of projects and their size (measurable in terms of turnover), and the effect of efficiency on the basis of investments and profitability.
I therefore expect that the companies which are more centrally positioned and make greater use of network resources have less need to make investments and are more profitable (proposition 4).
I also expect that the centrality of a firm in the network structure of the industry is related to its capacity to increase the number of projects on which it works and therefore its turnover (proposition 5).
Method
Given the complexity and variety of the research questions listed above, the study first One limitation of this approach is the methodological risk involved in measuring all of the variables by means of questions answered by a single respondent. Although there is a greater risk that the results may not be valid, this procedure is widely used in organisational research because of its practical nature and the fact that it is difficult to gain access to more than one respondent. Furthermore, the fact that the data were collected in relation to a specific time reduces the likelihood of being able to infer causal relationships from the correlations between multiple variables. This difficulty is particularly relevant in the case of the relationship between trust and cooperation, whose direction of causality is difficult enough to establish even at a conceptual level. Some of these methodological limitations were mitigated by the fact that I had a great deal of qualitative information about each company, and that the company representative completing the quantitative questionnaire was almost always both a manager and shareholder; but for better overcoming this limitation I decided to consider not only the survey data but also the data on all major projects carried out by its members collected by the association Cartoon Italia. Not covered by these archival data on common projects are minor projects or projects for the production of TV-ads. These data report the name of the project, the type and, if present, the partners. With this information I could construct a 16x16 matrix on actual cooperation among members of Cartoon Italia, 
Results
The research underlying this paper was indeed begun in the year 2000 because I was so surprised when I heard Pietro Campedelli, the President of Cartoon Italia, describe his internally coherent story of re-foundation of an existing declining industry into a new one. The fundamental aspect was to understand the processes that allowed a group of under-capitalised artisans to make such a qualitative leap, and the role played by trust and the networks of cooperative social relationships in favouring such a development.
According to our interviews the institutional strategy of Pietro Campedelli as an institutional entrepreneur has been twofold, directed both at obtaining internal and external legitimation.
Externally the strategy was aimed at gaining cognitive and sociopolitical legitimation.
The association had been able to influence the change in the attitude of RAI (the Italian state radio/TV network) which 1996, under the Presidency of Letizia Moratti, was no longer exclusively interested in purchasing the rights to broadcast foreign productions, but also prepared to co-finance production projects in Italy (IslCult, 1998) . In parallel Internally the strategy was aimed at spurring the emergence of new entrepreneurial energies, in various forms: the return of the professionals who emigrated during the crisis years has led to the introduction of new organisational and technological models; the willingness of some of the "survivors" to rejoin the game has allowed for fresh financial resources. Moreover the very role played by Pietro Campedelli, whose previous career was that of a management consultant external to the sector, has been to open up financial channels (merchant banks in Germany and Luxembourg, and broadcasters such as EM-TV) and foreign co-productions, and, perhaps more importantly, to introduce a specific "network" idea by promoting the foundation of the association Cartoon Italia of which he became President. These actions did not only bring into the industry the business knowledge that the industry previously lacked, but also innovative ideas as to how to govern the relationships between the individual members making up the industry itself, who were previously independent artisans jealous of their artistic and productive independence. These new ideas were trust, networking and co-operation.
But how far was the discourse of cooperation, trust and the "network" propagated by the Association's President empirically supported by the arguments and values of the people operating in the sector, as well as by the structure of their relationships? To which extent the trust and characteristics of such relationships can explain this renewed economic success?
I shall first present the results concerning the analysis of the components of trust. Table   1 shows the results of a regression analysis whose dependent variable was the trust The network structure of the actors' relations is quite but not very dense (for an interpretation of density values in terms of greater or lesser intensity, see Soda/Usai, 1999) . Density is the relationship existing between the number of ties in the network of relations and the total number of potential ties. The density of the network of collaborations (question 6) has a value of 0.3333 when the intensity of collaboration is one or more, 0.2292 when it is two or more, 0.1417 when it is three or more, and 0.0333 when it is four. Only three of the companies fall outside the network of collaborations insofar as they do not have relationships with any other company. Furthermore, the maximum number of "steps" that a company must make to contact another (the so called geodesic distance) is three in the case of the cooperation network with values of one or more, four in the case of that with values of two or more, whereas the mean of these distances is respectively 1.577 and 1.955: the members of Cartoon Italia therefore find themselves "near" each other; the institutionalisation of relationships of trust in the association Cartoon Italia has made it easier to identify cooperative frameworks.
The level of centralisation of the network is medium/medium-low depending on the considered measure: i.e. there is no company or clique of companies that dominates the relational structure, even though some of the companies are more influential than the others. The centralisation of the relational network has a value of 9.64% if we consider Freeman's betweeness centrality index for symmetrised collaboration values of two or more (the same value is 8.13% when considering the Common Projects variable dichotomised for values equal or greater than 1). However, the index of centralisation is higher if we consider Freeman's active ( outdegree) and passive ( indegree) degree centrality of the attributions of cooperation among the counterparts: for an intensity of cooperation of one or more, the indegree is 28.444% and the outdegree 71.111%; for an intensity of two or more, the indegree is 32.444% and the outdegree 32.444%; and for an intensity of cooperation of three or more, the indegree is 20.444% and the outdegree 20.444% (the fact that these two figures are identical indicates the reciprocity of attribution of highly intense cooperation relations). The same index of centralisation (Freeman's degree centrality) is 33.33% when considering the Common Projects variable dichotomised for values equal or greater than 1. On the other hand, if we consider the centrality of the network of relationships of trust (question 4) with an intensity of two or more, the indegree is 44% and the outdegree 29% (in this case, the difference in the values indicates that the enjoyed trust is more centralised than the attributed trust).
The mean centralisation of the network of relations gives rise to some cliques.
Technically, a clique 4 within a network of relations is the broadest part of a sub-set relations with three or more nodes (companies, people, …) in which each node is adjacent to all of the other nodes belonging to the sub-set, and there are no other nodes external to the sub-set that are adjacent to all of the nodes belonging to the sub-set itself.
Theoretically, cliques represent areas of more intense relationships within a network of relations. With regard to the network of relations for collaborations with an intensity of two or more, I have been able to identify the existence of five cliques. These five cliques are made up of six companies: four service companies (specialists in one phase in the cartoon pipeline, such as computer based colouring) and two main contractors.
Furthermore, the qualitative data show that three of these six companies are hypothesising a merger, a fact which supports Aldrich and Fiol's (1994: 654) prediction that "[i]nitial collaborations begin informally, in networks of interfirm relations, but some later develop into more formalized strategic alliances, consortia, and trade associations".
These results indicate the importance of complementarity in favouring collaboration.
What is more, if we consider the network of relationships for collaborations with an intensity of one or more, there are 14 cliques and the correlation between belonging to a clique or not and being a specialised company or not is 0.71, which further supports the importance of complementarity. The correlation between geographical belonging and membership of a clique, which was calculated in order to exclude influences other than complementarity, was very low and not significant (correlation index 0.164, p value 0.117) 5 . On the contrary, the correlation between complementarity and belonging to a clique was 0.392 and highly significant (p value 0.002) 6 . Moreover the correlation between complementarity and belonging to a clique based on the Common Projects variable (archival data) was 0.311 and highly significant (p value 0.004).
The importance of complementarity within the industry was confirmed by a regression analysis with the number of cliques to which a company belongs 7 as the dependent variable. This analysis made it possible to verify proposition 2 and proposition 3. As shown in Table 2 under point a., the presence of a sufficiently dense structure of social relations and relationships of trust favours collaboration within Cartoon Italia, and has this effect above all by favouring the cooperation of players with complementary resources. Table 2 under point b. also shows that using as independent variable
Membership of cliques based on Common Projects (archival data), the direction of the effects remains the same, but the effects are less intense and in some cases less significant or even non significant. Particularly the variable Exchange of Information looses significance in the fourth model. 5 In technical terms, a matrix was constructed that represented the same geographical belonging (values 0 and 1) and was correlated with the Clique Co-Membership matrix for the intensity of collaboration using a quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) that associates Pearson's coefficient with a non-parametric estimate of the robustness of the result by means of a randomised iterative procedure (see Cichetti/Lomi, 2001) . 6 In technical terms, a matrix was constructed that represented the identity or difference of the governed production phase (values 0 and 1) and was correlated with the Clique Co-Membership matrix for an intensity of collaboration of one or more. 7 Again as a Clique Co-Membership for an intensity of collaboration of one or more.
Tab. 2 Regression models for predicting a. Membership of collaboration cliques, b. Together with trust and (less) the habit of exchanging information, the technological complementarity within the industry therefore explains the number of collaboration cliques in which each company is present with others (as in the case of a consortium specialised by phases set up by some of the companies interviewed).
Membership of Common Projects cliques
The qualitative data also offered some other unforeseen confirmations of the effect of complementarity: i.e. its effect in relation to subjects outside the industry. There are the following agreements or agreement hypotheses with subjects from different sectors or countries: − the entry of a cinema film producer/distributor as a result of the acquisition of the largest company belonging to Cartoon Italia; − a merger between one of the companies and a book publisher;
− cooperation of one of the companies with a publisher and advertising agencies; − a possible merger between one of the companies, the above-mentioned consortium and a player outside the Media sector; − the acquisition of one of the companies by a foreign player;
− the acquisition by a television company of one company that subsequently left Cartoon Italia (from my last meeting with Pietro Campedelli); − the growing importance of international rather than national co-productions.
In relation to this growing interest by other industries Pietro Campedelli said that: "Outside investors are more than welcome. It is a good thing that Medusa acquired Lanterna Magica. Having a powerful distributor in the circle is an accelerator. The important thing is that the outsiders act as catalysts rather than disaggregators, which is why Cartoon Italia needs to be even stronger. The danger is that, as has recently happened, and outsider arrives who immediately switches all of the production to the Far East. It is necessary to increase the production not the internationalisation".
Interindustry sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994) has still to be completely gained.
But, despite the medium density of their collaborative relationships, the good level of reciprocal trust and the multiplicity of the projects in which they are involved together, the qualitative data show that the members of Cartoon Italia speak of little or no cooperation. Most of them identify themselves with the values and general objectives of Cartoon Italia, but they do not believe that the association has the capacity to introduce real cooperation among people used to working as independent artists (as one entrepreneur said: "everyone only sees his own backyard"). This result was surprising and I will discuss it below.
On the other hand, the results concerning the relationship between the structure of network relations and economic performance are ambivalent. Proposition 4 that the companies positioned more centrally and which make greater use of network resources should have less need to make investments and are more profitable was confirmed. Secondly, the most central companies in the collaboration network are also those that are less obliged to immobilise large-scale investments because they can specialise and also rely on the investments of others. Centrality in the network of cooperation (Freeman centrality value) significantly and negatively correlates with the total investments made in the last three years by each company: the coefficient of correlation is -0.627 (p value 0.039 2-tailed), and the analysis of regression using total investments as the dependent variable has an adjusted correlation index of 0.326 (significance of the model, constant term and variable respectively 0.039, 0.013 and 0.039).
The ambivalence in the relationship between the structure of network relations and economic performance comes from the inability to verify proposition 5, which states that the centrality of a company in the network structure should correlate with its capacity to increase the number of the projects it participates in and therefore its turnover. The measures of economic performance do not show any significant correlation with the network structure variables that were felt to be important. As I expected, the companies attributing (outdegree) greater trust 8 to the others are also those claiming better results (correlation index 0.420) (question 7), but the relationship is not significant (p value 0.198). played a more important role than trust itself, which also includes past relations and reciprocal knowledge: being trusted by the other members of the network in terms of one's ability to contribute in an innovative manner seems to be particularly important in a market such as that of animated cartoons, which is rapidly growing and subject to qualitative discontinuities. Pietro Campedelli added the interpretation that, in an authorbased artistic sector (which is what the Italian animated cartoon industry was until a short time ago and, to some extent still is), past trust tends to separate rather than unite:
"It is easier to make an opportunistic choice of a travelling companion in normal production industries, but when gut-feelings are involved -because the evaluation is based on aesthetic excellence rather than economic/production criteria -it is difficult to cooperate and make a team. Everyone has his or her own idea of what is artistic and, even if he or she respects the ideas of others, it is difficult to integrate them in a common project. Continuity and the sense of belonging may play a negative role". This is also probably the reason why the members of Cartoon Italia speak of little or no 8 The calculation was made by dichotomising the variable on the basis of values of 2 or more. cooperation: they conceive as cooperation something going beyond pulling together complementary resources, i.e. something involving also cooperation in the artistic part of the project. The careers of the social actors, as carriers of attitudes of artisan-like "artistic" production and specific capabilities, seem to have a relevant impact here, and the stickiness in adapting extant core attitudes and capabilities risk to transform them into "core rigidities" (Jones, 2001: 915) . The new business-like identities which entered the arena were only partially in a position to change the previous institutionalised governance regime and are still in a dialectic tension with the artistic identities.
Conclusions
The rebirth of an industry can be a more difficult task than the emergence of a new industry. The evidence presented in this paper shows that past heritage can have at the same time a hindering and supporting effect. Legitimacy strategies of network entrepreneurs have to be directed both at legitimising new forms of governance and perceptions, and at de-legitimising old ones. The importance of telling a internally consistent story for getting legitimation has been shown, although reality may partially lack behind. Cartoon Italia, as a third-party actor (Aldrich/Fiol, 1994) , acted at both the intraindustry, interindustry and institutional levels pursuing instrumental and legitimation resources.
Comparing the discourse of the network entrepreneur with the "reality", as displayed in this study, it can be reasonably said that a network of trust relationships exists in Cartoon Italia, but it is relatively fragile and has not yet had all of its hoped for effects on performance. The relationships are due to the esteem for the other members of the association that the companies have matured over time. Shared aspirations, objectives and values identify a network culture that bears witness to a relatively solid relational fabric. The esteem and trust are due to the acknowledged artistic and technical professionalism of the different players; their economic effects are exclusively limited to increased efficiency and the possibility of capital savings, but do not lead to a significant increase in the scale of the business. It is therefore a case of a history and culture of small craftsmen enriched by new ideas and visions (network and trust) that have created a communion of values but have so far had only partial effects on cooperation, which tends to be limited to complementary relations concerning production phases (sequential pipeline relations rather than relationships concerning real joint production or creation). The "network" approach of cooperation and trust propagated by the President of the association has been partially confirmed at empirical level by the discourses and values of the companies in the industry, but it does not seem that this relational structure has still become sufficiently strong to be able to overcome the effects of past institutionalisation.
The agreements between the parties take the form of satisfying a need to valorise their wide-ranging competences and make the most of their technical investments and human resources, as well as the opportunity to find new funding; however, despite their considerable success, they do not seem yet to reflect a completely coherent new governance regime. The artistic and the business components, partly still bound to different identities and careers, are in a situation of tension, that has not yet found an equilibrium. Although it seems that Cartoon Italia can be rightly considered a social network, the complexities and uncertainties of the challenges facing the industry may require closer forms of cooperation also at the artistic level.
This study restates the theoretical position that the in the process of industry creation institutional and community events are of paramount importance and advances even stronger the role of network entrepreneurship. However the innovative contention of this paper lays in the recognition of specific conditions of the re-emerging/re-birth/refounding of industries, which require the understanding of the parallel processes of legitimation of the new and de-legitimation of the old and, regarding creative industries, the contemporary presence of artistic and business requirements. Conflicting institutional pressures may coexist and have be taken into consideration. They may even never be resolved. The answer to the question of "coupling or uncoupling of Art and Business", may be one of an enduring dynamic tension between domains posing conflicting institutional pressures, a tension which can be paralysing, as partly the case in the Italian animated cartoon industry, or highly creative.
